| Summary: | Because the environmental threats are becoming global in scope, international cooperation and global governance issues are in the spotlight. The most controversial environmental law and policy problems arise in the areas where no individual state has sole responsibility for governing, "global commons." Scholars believe that the best way to deal with them is through self-enforcing international treaties, but these treaties often fail to change countries' behavior. This research examines the patterns in the texts of international environmental treaties that might ensure its success. The study applies the theory of international environmental treaty-making elaborated by a leading scholar on transnational and global challenges, Scott Barrett. The study examines several treaties through the lenses of the theory: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)(1973) as an example of a successful treaty and the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) (1988) as an illustration of an inefficient one. It also tries to apply the theory to the latest draft of the text of the upcoming United Nations treaty to protect marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). The negotiations over the UN BBNJ treaty are still in progress. The research uses content analysis and semi-structured interviews with active participants of the treaty's negotiations. The study aims to determine whether the upcoming UN BBNJ treaty has the existing successful international environmental treaties' features.
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