| Summary: | The Svalbard Treaty confers full and absolute sovereignty of Svalbard’s land and territorial waters of the Svalbard archipelago to Norway. It also stipulates that all states that have ratified the Treaty enjoy equal right of access to the land and the territorial waters. Following the development in the Law of the Sea in the seventies, which allowed coastal states to establish an exclusive economic zone off their coast, Norway rather decided to establish a Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard to avoid a conflict with several states. Contrary to most other states, Norway does not consider that the Svalbard Treaty applies to the zone since the Treaty refers only to the territorial waters of the archipelago. Consequently, only a handful of states have been granted access by Norway: Russia and some countries that have been traditionally fishing in the area. This thesis explores the disagreement between Norway and Russia regarding the legal status of the Fisheries Protection Zone and their ability to manage their conflicts. It also looks at the extensive cooperation on fisheries management between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, where the Fisheries Protection Zone is located. Using the international relations theory of Complex Interdependence to analyze the relationship between the two states in the zone and, more broadly in the Barents Sea, it appears that, despite their disagreement, the two states are constraint to manage their conflicts in the zone and avoid an escalation because their mutual economic interest in the Barents Sea is too important. It seems that both Norway and Russia would have too much to lose if the status quo were to change.
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