| Summary: | From an international perspective, the popularly elected Sámediggis (Sámi Parliaments), established more than two decades ago in the Nordic countries of Finland, Norway and Sweden, represent unique institutional arrangements to enhance and safeguard indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. In this article the authors compare the legal basis, status, authority and mandate of the Sámi people’s representative institutions, as well as the actual influence and autonomy of the Sámediggis in relation to the national political institutions in the respective country. The comparison reveals several differences between the institutions and brings to the fore three problems manifesting different ways in which nation-states may delimit indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination: 1) how a popularly elected indigenous parliament that successfully gains political autonomy and influence through participation in national politics and institutions always run the risk of being set aside by the State on matters of conflict (Norway); 2) how the historical legacy of a divide and rule government policy may justify a continued paternalistic state politics by perpetuating power relations within the indigenous community (Sweden); and 3) how conflicts between an indigenous people and the State in which they live concerning the right to define the people may delimit the right to self-determination and further conflicts between groups claiming indigenous status (Finland). The authors argue in their concluding remarks that these kinds of indigenous institutions may be a way to increase political autonomy and influence, and ultimately a relational form of self-determination within already existing state boundaries. There are, however, several obstacles for the Sámediggis of today to safeguarding Sámi self-determination, including the colonial past, the formal status granted the parliament, and the national policy and implementation of international law. Moreover, the different ways in which the states have handled these obstacles lead the authors to ask if the Sámediggis might best be understood as three distinct ways of institutionalising non-territorial indigenous self-determination; rather than as a unified Nordic model.
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