| Summary: | This study examines the formulation of and interplay between the US, Canadian, and British policies generated in response to the mass atrocities perpetrated by Islamabad authorities in East Pakistan during 1971. It focuses on the reactions of these three closely-connected North Atlantic powers to the gross human rights abuses, analyzing the decision-making processes in Washington, Ottawa, and London during the crucial first few months of the crisis, identifying the forces at play in determining policy, and investigating the nature, development, and resolution of debates over national interests and ethical concerns. The analysis is built primarily upon documentary evidence from the US National Archives, the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Library and Archives Canada, and the National Archives of the United Kingdom. In Washington, President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, exerted great personal influence over the determination of policy and favored a strategy of appeasement. Importantly, their secret initiative to secure rapprochement with China, which only sprang into life at the end of April, did not drive their thinking during the vital first month after the clampdown began as Kissinger has previously claimed. In Ottawa, the Canadian government developed a tentative four-strand response, unwilling to hazard bilateral ties with Islamabad or draw attention to its own separatist issue in Quebec. In the UK, notably strong public sympathy for the victims of the clampdown only influenced policy to a limited extent. Nevertheless, Londonâ s response, though similar in form to that of Ottawa, in substance demonstrated a greater willingness to coerce Islamabad into ending its oppressive action. This work considers the limited interplay between the North Atlantic powers in determining their reactions, discussing the collaborative opportunities both accepted and spurned. The overall conclusion compares policies and their determinants, assesses the alternative options available, considers the blinkered nature of government institutional cultures formed around the protection of national interests narrowly construed, and explains the techniques of obfuscation and excuse employed by officials to avoid demands for firmer action. Ph.D. 2019-11-30 00:00:00
|
|---|