Expotition [sic] to the North Pole, the 20th century search for mind
grantor: University of Toronto Functionalism, in one form or another, is widely accepted in philosophy and cognitive science as an account of the relationship between mental states and brain states. This thesis claims, however, that the functionalist model of mind is unstable and attempts to demonst...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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2000
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1807/14031 http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ50319.pdf |
| Summary: | grantor: University of Toronto Functionalism, in one form or another, is widely accepted in philosophy and cognitive science as an account of the relationship between mental states and brain states. This thesis claims, however, that the functionalist model of mind is unstable and attempts to demonstrate it consistently "falls back on" earlier theories (e.g., eliminativist behaviorism, identity theory) whose problems it was designed to overcome. The work of Robert Van Gulick, Daniel Dennett, and Fred Dretske is examined in order to show how each of these functionalist philosophers takes their representationalist explanation of intentional mental states (e.g., beliefs and desires) and uses it to develop an account of subjective consciousness. The thesis concludes that representational models which are based on the functionalist's tri-level account of mind still have some way to go before they can be said to provide a viable account of either intentionality or phenomenal consciousness. M.A. |
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