Nastanek bančne luknje v Sloveniji kot posledica dejanj z znaki gospodarske kriminalitete
Bančna luknja in vsa vprašanja, povezana z njo, so predmet javnih in strokovnih diskusij že zadnjih nekaj let. Čeprav se z njo ukvarja vrsta specializiranih teles, oblikovanih znotraj nekaterih državnih institucij, kot so Banka Slovenije, Državno tožilstvo in parlamentarna preiskovalna komisija, po...
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| Format: | Bachelor Thesis |
| Language: | Slovenian |
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A. J. Pirnat]
2016
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| Online Access: | https://dk.um.si/IzpisGradiva.php?id=63599 https://dk.um.si/Dokument.php?id=104147&dn= http://www.cobiss.si/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=cobib&rid=3259626&fmt=11 |
| Summary: | Bančna luknja in vsa vprašanja, povezana z njo, so predmet javnih in strokovnih diskusij že zadnjih nekaj let. Čeprav se z njo ukvarja vrsta specializiranih teles, oblikovanih znotraj nekaterih državnih institucij, kot so Banka Slovenije, Državno tožilstvo in parlamentarna preiskovalna komisija, po nekaj letih javnost in stroka še vedno nista dobili odgovorov na več pomembnih vprašanj. Prvo med njimi je vsekakor iskanje odgovornih za nastanek bančne luknje. Del krivde za njen nastanek je mogoče pripisati zunanjim, na primer makroekonomskim okoliščinam. Večji del krivde pa je zagotovo na bankah samih in na državi. V tem kontekstu se postavlja vprašanje ustreznosti korporativnega upravljanja. To še posebej velja za državne banke. Zakonitost delovanja upravljavskih organov bank, kar vključuje vodenje in nadzor banke, ter vprašljiva učinkovitost nadzora s strani Banke Slovenije sta dve pomembni premisi v iskanju odgovornih za nastanek bančne luknje. Ko je govora o krivdi bank samih, je treba ločevati med slabimi poslovnimi odločitvami bankirjev, ki so bile sprejete v dobri veri, in med bančno kriminaliteto. Razlogov za bančno luknjo namreč zagotovo ne gre iskati izključno v bančni kriminaliteti, pač pa tudi v drugih razlogih, ki nimajo kriminalne osnove. Ker so največje izgube nastale v treh največjih slovenskih bankah, ki so bile vse v državni lasti, ne gre zanemariti tudi vprašanja politične odgovornosti, saj je bila politika tista, ki je imenovala nadzorne svete bank, ti pa naprej uprave. Kako politika gleda na bančno krizo, je razvidno iz analize nekaterih sej Državnega zbora in sej delovnih teles ter iz zapisov sej parlamentarne preiskovalne skupine. Kdaj so bančno kriminaliteto zaznali organi odkrivanja in pregona ter kako so se te problematike lotili, je razvidno iz letnih poročil dela policije in tožilstva. Iz teh poročil je mogoče razbrati tudi, s kakšnimi težavami so se srečevali pri preiskovanju in pri zbiranju dokazov. Pomembno vlogo je odigral institut bančne tajnosti, na katerega so se banke pogosto sklicevale, ko so s strani organov odkrivanja in pregona kaznivih dejanj prejele prošnje za posredovanje podatkov o konkretnih bančnih poslih. Po zbranih dokazih in po vložitvi kazenskih ovadb ter odškodninskih tožbah bodo na vrsti sodišča. Sodni postopki bodo dali odgovor na vprašanje, ali bo bančna kriminaliteta v Sloveniji dobila epilog, tako kot ga je zelo hitro dobila na Islandiji. Slovenian bank liquidity gap (bank hole) and all issues related to it have been the subject of public and expert discussions for quite a few years now. Despite the fact, that many specialised bodies formed within some state institutions, like Bank of Slovenia, The Office of State Prosecutor General and Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, are heavily engaged in solving this problem, many important questions remain unanswered. The first of them is definitely finding those responsible for the formation of the bank liquidity gap. Part of the blame for its formation can be attributed to external, for example macroeconomic, circumstances. But a much larger part of the blame is definitely carried by the state and the banks themselves. In this context, it raises the question of the adequacy of corporate governance. This particularly applies to the state banks. Legality of functioning of the governing bodies of banks, which includes the management and supervision of banks, and questionable effectiveness of supervision by the Bank of Slovenia, are two major premises in finding those responsible for the formation of bank liquidity gap. When there is talk about putting the blame on the banks themselves, it is necessary to differentiate between bad business decisions made in good faith by bankers, and banking crime. Reasons for the formation of bank liquidity gap certainly do not lie exclusively in the banking crime, but also in other areas that have no criminal basis. Since the maximum loss incurred in the three largest Slovenian banks, all of which were state-owned, it is also important not to overlook the question of political responsibility. After all, it was the politics who appointed supervisory boards of the banks, before they then appointed the bank administration. The analysis of the parliamentary sittings and sittings of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry offers insight on how the politics sees the Slovenian banking crisis, and the analysis of annual reports of the Slovenian police and The Office of the State Prosecutor General gives a clearer picture when criminal activity in banking was detected by law enforcement bodies and how they dealt with this problem. The latter reports also show what kind of obstacles they faced during the investigation. An important part in this was played by the institute of banking secrecy, to which the banks invoked on many occasions when they received requests for submission of their business operations from the law enforcement authorities. When all the evidence will be gathered and all criminal charges filed, the action will turn to the courts. In the end, judicial procedures will provide an answer if banking crime will receive its epilogue in Slovenia, like it quickly did in Iceland for example. |
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