Towards an analysis of voting power in parliament: an exploration into coalition-making in Nordic parliaments

In this explorative paper, coalitions in national assemblies are analysed as n-person games with the Penrose-Banzhaf solution concept. It is shown that forming minority coalitions may result from a rational strategy to maximize voting power. Thus, there is no need to attempt a permanent minimum winn...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Acta Politica
Main Authors: Lane, Jan-Erik, Maeland, Reinert
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:English
Published: Palgrave Macmillan 2007
Subjects:
Probability Theory and Statistics
multipartism
Machiavellianism as maximizing voting power
Penrose-Banzhaf approach
Wicksell's unanimity principle
minority coalitions
calculus and interpretation
Nordic parliaments
Norway
Iceland
Online Access:https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/968977
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500169
Description
Summary:In this explorative paper, coalitions in national assemblies are analysed as n-person games with the Penrose-Banzhaf solution concept. It is shown that forming minority coalitions may result from a rational strategy to maximize voting power. Thus, there is no need to attempt a permanent minimum winning coalition. Moreover, maximizing voting power for a group of players like a disciplined political party involves the making of temporary coalitions over the entire political space, as anything goes. The examples looked at include the present Nordic parliamentary situation in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland.

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