| Summary: | The article considers the relation between propositional knowledge and image; at the beginning, we review three theories which deal with this subject: Pylyshyn's, Paivio's and Kosslyn's. We accept Kosslyn's theory as most suitable for our purposes and reject the other two because they are not true to the facts. Imagery is one of the essential parts of our mental life and it is not totally reducible to propositional knowledge. In the process of forming and understanding of metaphor, both imagery and propositional knowledge are present.Our concluding argument is that we cannot use the notion of »seeing as« in an account of metaphor because it is already metaphorical. For a correct account of metaphor, we need notions which are not themselves »laden« with metaphorical components. Članek obravnava odnos med propozicionalnim vedenjem in podobo. Na začetku podamo pregled treh teorij, ki se ukvarjajo s tem predmetom: Pylyshynovo, Paiviojevo in Kosslynovo. Kot najbolj sprejemljivo za naš namen sprejmemo Kossly-novo ter zavrnemo drugi dve, ker se ne ujemata z dejstvi. Prispodabljanje je eden od bistvenih delov našega duševnega življenja ter se ga ne da povsem reducirati na propozicionalno znanje. V procesu oblikovanja in razumevanja metafore sta navzoči tako propozicionalno znanje kot prispodabljanje. Naša sklepna ugotovitev je, da pojma »zdeti se kot« v primeru metafore ne moremo uporabljati, saj je že sam metaforičen. Za pravilno obravnavo metafore potrebujemo pojme, ki sami niso obremenjeni z metaforičnimi sestavinami.
|
|---|