Avoiding War: How Should Northern Europe Respond to the US-Russian Rivalry?

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints on their NATO mem...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Arctic Review on Law and Politics
Main Author: Tormod Heier
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:English
Norwegian
Published: Cappelen Damm Akademisk NOASP 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v9.1218
https://doaj.org/article/a2aa725bfd474862b7060b0f2cc33265
Description
Summary:Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints on their NATO memberships. Providing Northern Europe with a stable “buffer” between East and West, this so-called Nordic balance kept the United States and Soviet Union at an arm’s length. Since 2014 however, Northern Europe has de facto slid from “buffer” to “springboard” for US forces. This slide may counter Russian assertiveness, but there is also reason to argue that it may increase regional tension and unpredictability. If so, this may leave the entire region with less rather than more security. Using the case of Norway, it is argued that too close an alignment with NATO may have accelerated Norway’s role as a “springboard” for US forces. This is because cost-intensive reforms needed to accommodate US expectations abroad have also exacerbated critical vulnerabilities at home. Increased dependency on US forces thereby makes difficult the balance between deterrence and restraint vis-à-vis Russia. Responsible Editor: Øyvind Ravna, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway