China's Arctic turn: reasons, developments, perspectives

• Main Author: Paul, Michael
• Other Authors: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit
• Format: Other/Unknown Material
• Language: unknown
• Published: DEU 2025
• Subjects: Internationale Beziehungen; International relations; Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitspolitik; Arktis; Arktisches Meer; Wirtschaftliche Interessen; Regionale strategische Konzeption; Entwicklungspolitik; International Politics; Foreign Affairs; Development Policy; China; Nordpolargebiet; Außenpolitik; Interessenpolitik; Sicherheitspolitik; Arctic; foreign policy; pressure-group politics; security policy; 10500; Arctic Ocean; Nuuk; Arktis*; greenlandic; Nordpol*
• Online Access: https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/101544; http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-101544-9; https://doi.org/10.18449/2025C08

Apart from several infrastructure projects which ultimately failed, and a surprise visit by the icebreaker Xuelong off the Greenlandic capital, Nuuk, the People's Repub­lic of China has long maintained a cautious and reserved presence in the Arctic in the shadow of Russia and its fleet of icebreakers. But in July and August 2024, three ice­breakers - Xuelong 2, Ji Di and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di - made China's growing pres­ence felt in the Arctic for the first time ever. Beijing is thus signalling more ambitious intentions, and the construction of a heavy icebreaker could enable China to establish a permanent presence in the Arctic Ocean. This development reached a peculiar climax in October 2024, when the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti ran the headline: "The Arctic is becoming Chinese." What are the reasons and implications of China's Arctic turn? (author's abstract)