Russian crisis management from Able Archer 1983 to Andøya 1995: Successful avoidance of nuclear escalation or ‘rolling the nuclear dice’?
Theory on successful crisis management is applied to try to shed light on two important and relatively under-examined nuclear crises and their further implications for Russian nuclear crisis management. By conducting a historical explorative type of thesis, I apply Stephen J. Cimbala’s four attribut...
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| Format: | Master Thesis |
| Language: | Norwegian Bokmål |
| Published: |
2021
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10852/88581 http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-91207 |
| Summary: | Theory on successful crisis management is applied to try to shed light on two important and relatively under-examined nuclear crises and their further implications for Russian nuclear crisis management. By conducting a historical explorative type of thesis, I apply Stephen J. Cimbala’s four attributes of successful crisis management to explain Russian success at managing the 1983 Able Archer crisis and the 1995 Andøya rocket crisis. The cases are chosen based on their reputation as notable incidents of possible near use of nuclear weapons with huge potential ramifications for at least Norway and Europe. The attributes include “Communication transparency”, “Reducing time pressure on policymakers and commanders”, “Ability to offer safety to the adversary”, and “Maintaining accurate perceptions of the adversary's intentions and military capabilities.” The results of the analysis suggest that Russia and the Soviet Union managed the two crises with a different level of success. Russia’s crisis management during the Andøya rocket crisis appears most successful, although crisis specific differences might explain at least some differences. Communication transparency appears as a problem in both crises because of poor signaling. |
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