Slipper Skippers and Absentee Landlord: Examining Social and Economic Implications of Resource Privatisation
"Slipper skippers", "absentee landlord" or "absentee ownership", "fleet separation policy". All these expressions describe a single feature: the separation between two economic functions, ownership (who gets the right to access the resource) and production (wh...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Report |
| Language: | English unknown |
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International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/gf06g3830 |
| Summary: | "Slipper skippers", "absentee landlord" or "absentee ownership", "fleet separation policy". All these expressions describe a single feature: the separation between two economic functions, ownership (who gets the right to access the resource) and production (who exerts the right). This issue is considered as highly sensitive in several places, such as Canada and USA. In these countries, most fisheries are managed under an "owner / operator" clause because of social pressure. In other places, such as New Zealand, the separation of the two functions is often promoted, because it is considered as a way of improving wealth generation. And in Iceland, this separation occurs as a result of the implementation of specific management systems (ITQ), although it may not have been always originally planned. After exploring the design of management systems that may induce the separation between ownership and production functions, the paper discusses the arguments that are developed by proponents and opponents of the phenomenon. By doing so, it aims at clarifying what the issue at stake really is, and what the associated costs and benefits for the society are. This review of arguments from both sides suggests that although discussions mainly focus on rent distribution or rent capture issues, within the fisheries sector, there may also be some other broader implications regarding social welfare. It also suggests that specific fisheries setting (e.g. capital-intensive vs. labour-intensive fishing operations) and macroeconomic conditions (e.g. level of unemployment) may play an important role in examining the net societal effects of the phenomenon. KEYWORDS: Rent Capture, Fisheries Management, Resource Ownership |
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