| Summary: | In this article the procedural role of the Icelandic Parliament in ministerial impeachment cases is analysed in view of the historical lineage of the current system and the experience of the first such case against the former prime minister Geir H. Haarde. The focus of analysis is on three complaints about the current procedural role of the Icelandic Parliament, and these assessed based on theories of social institutions that are tasked with making adjudicative decisions. It is revealed that the procedural regime, originating in its current form from 1963, has several flaws. These flaws increase the probability that the Parliament will approach its procedural task in ministerial impeachment cases based on a political decisional modality, instead of a legalistic decisional modality. The current regime effectively offsets the risk of false convictions but is ineffective in avoiding impunity for culpable actions of ministers. Ministers thus face a different procedural reality than the public in Iceland, who must as a rule bear criminal responsibility for culpable employment behaviour. Peer reviewed
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