| Summary: | The Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) approach to fisheries management has been promoted as a way to improve efficiency by reducing biological and economic overfishing. However, ITQ´s have also been challenged from environmental and social perspectives while observed efficiency gains have fallen well below estimated potential. This thesis examines these topics in the context of Iceland´s ITQ system in order to shed light on the potential contribution of ITQ´s to sustainable development. Iceland´s ITQ system is a useful case for studying the impact of ITQ´s since it is one of the world´s oldest and is widely regarded as a success, while the historic importance of fishing to Iceland means that the impact of introducing ITQ´s has been subject to intense national scrutiny. Paper I applies established indicators of industry concentration and competitive rivalry to quota holdings at company and vessel level across species in order to quantify changes in industry structure following the introduction of ITQ´s. For several species, concentration has reached levels associated with market power and further consolidation is increasingly hampered by regulatory limits. The results suggest that a review of these limits may be overdue. Paper II investigates the large apparent gap between reported and potential economic rent in Iceland´s harvesting sector by quantifying the contribution of transfers to processing, fishermen and the government. The results indicate that cumulative transfers to these groups between 2002-2014 exceeded reported rent. A speculative explanatory model is presented in which stakeholder representatives cooperate in order to obfuscate resource rent from harvesting and reduce pressure for reallocation to society at large. Paper III examines the transitional gains trap, a phenomenon claimed to reduce the political scope for reallocation of quota rent due to resistance from harvesters who paid for the quota rather than being granted them as a result of grandfathering. A potential measure of the trap, based ...
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