| Summary: | SECKERSON v. SINCLAIR 629 than one of these piles, one flax and one spelts. They were both in ashes.” etc. If, indeed, this answer can be taken as testimony as to conclusions rather than as to facts, there is no case where a person who testifies as to what he has seen or heard does not so testify. Nor is there any merit in the objection to the questions propounded to and answered by the plaintiff Seckerson, as to the value of the house hold furniture which was admittedly destroyed. The first question was, “Do you know about what, in the aggregate, this household and kitchen furniture was worth at the time it was burned?” and was an swered, “Yes, sir,——yes, very nearly. It was worth about $250 to $300. I had some tools and machinery burned in the fire. There was a five—horse hitch evener for a gang plow, and several other eveners and singletrees in the barn that were burned. They were worth ten to twelve dollars. The value was between ten and twelve dollars. I lost one truck wagon with a hayrack on, and one narrow-tired wagon run ning gear in the fire. I don’t know how long it had been in use. I had bought them second-handed. The truck was worth $22, and the narrow-tired wagon was worth about $10.” The objection made was that these questions called for a conclusion; that no foundation was laid; that they were not the proper measure of damages, and not ad missible under the pleadings. In his brief counsel for appellant argues that the measure of damages for personal property destroyed is its reasonable market value in the nearest market at the time it was burned, and he urges that the question and answer should have related to the time of the burning, not to a year and three months later. We do not think the question is open to these objections. It is well estab lished that the owner of personal property may himself testify as to its value without any other foundation being laid except as to his own ership and knowledge thereof. He need not qualify as an expert on values. So, too, second-hand goods of the nature described can hardly be said. to have a market value, and the rule as to such only requires a strict limitation as to the market values in cases where such values would be the fairest and the best measure of damages, and is ascertainable. What the law requires is certainty as far as possible, and an absence of specu-lation. It does not, however, require the impossible or the unreason able. As far as the objection to the time is concerned, it is absolutely
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