| Summary: | 398 NORTH DAKOTA REPORTS zan invalid one, the rule would be different. The fact that more facts are pleaded than necessary under the statute does not render the complaint demurrable if the required facts are stated and no other -or different cause of action is stated. We find no warrant for hold- ' ing that the plaintiffs have waived the statutory form of complaint or elected to plead another. The defendant relies on the case of -Swanson v. Greenland, 4 N. D. 532,-62 N. W. 603. That case is not applicable to this one. This complaint is authorized and its form prescribed by statute. It is therefore excepted from the principles applied in that case to an action for the foreclosure of a tax lien. The case of Walton v. Perkins, 28 Minn. 413, 10 N. W. 424, is also claimed to be in point. But we do not so understand it. In that -case the complaint was defective as a complaint in an equitable ac tion to cancel a mortgage which was a cloud upon a title to land. The court refused to sustain the complaint as sufficient under the statute which provided for settlement of adverse claims. The case of Bell v. Dangerfield, 26 Minn. 307, 3 N. W. 698, is also relied -on to support appellant’s contention on this point. That was a -case in which the general rules of pleading applied. In this case the statute provides what the complaint shall state. The case is not -therefore in point. The next objection urged against the complaint is that several causes of action are therein improperly united. The contention is that a cause of action is stated as to the lien derived from the sale during each of the years mentioned in the complaint. The liens -mentioned in the complaint, do not constitute a cause of action. The cause of action is that defendant claims an interest in the lots ad verse to plaintiffs’ interest therein as represented by the several tax liens. The relief sought is that the defendant be required to set forth those adverse claims, and that they be declared invalid by the _ court, and that plaintiffs have possession of the lots. No different relief is sought or can be granted than would follow if one lien only had been pleaded. The facts stated in the complaint do not state more than one cause of action. The last objection urged to the complaint is that the plaintiffs have not legal capacity to sue, that the action pertains to real prop erty, and that executors have no authority to bring such actions, but that such actions can be brought only by the heirs. The powers and duties of executors and administrators are prescribed by statute, and, unless such actions are authorized to be brought and maintained
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