The Reykjavik Summit and European Security

Many West Europeans have agreed in retrospect that the most disturbing feature of the Reykjavik summit was the apparent "indifference or quasi-indifference" of the United States regarding European security interests. 1 This judgment is based on the specific arms-control arrangements that P...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Yost, David S.
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:unknown
Published: SAIS Review 1987
Subjects:
Iceland
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10945/43333
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spelling ftnavalpschool:oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/43333 2024-06-09T07:47:06+00:00 The Reykjavik Summit and European Security Yost, David S. 1987 application/pdf https://hdl.handle.net/10945/43333 unknown SAIS Review https://hdl.handle.net/10945/43333 This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States. Article 1987 ftnavalpschool 2024-05-15T00:28:56Z Many West Europeans have agreed in retrospect that the most disturbing feature of the Reykjavik summit was the apparent "indifference or quasi-indifference" of the United States regarding European security interests. 1 This judgment is based on the specific arms-control arrangements that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed in Iceland in October 1986, plus the subsequent explanations of the U.S. administration. The Reykjavik summit also provided fresh evidence of the Soviet Union's more imaginative diplomatic style under Gorbachev and, more substantively, of enduring Soviet preferences regarding security in Europe. Article in Journal/Newspaper Iceland Naval Postgraduate School: Calhoun
institution Open Polar
collection Naval Postgraduate School: Calhoun
op_collection_id ftnavalpschool
language unknown
description Many West Europeans have agreed in retrospect that the most disturbing feature of the Reykjavik summit was the apparent "indifference or quasi-indifference" of the United States regarding European security interests. 1 This judgment is based on the specific arms-control arrangements that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed in Iceland in October 1986, plus the subsequent explanations of the U.S. administration. The Reykjavik summit also provided fresh evidence of the Soviet Union's more imaginative diplomatic style under Gorbachev and, more substantively, of enduring Soviet preferences regarding security in Europe.
format Article in Journal/Newspaper
author Yost, David S.
spellingShingle Yost, David S.
The Reykjavik Summit and European Security
author_facet Yost, David S.
author_sort Yost, David S.
title The Reykjavik Summit and European Security
title_short The Reykjavik Summit and European Security
title_full The Reykjavik Summit and European Security
title_fullStr The Reykjavik Summit and European Security
title_full_unstemmed The Reykjavik Summit and European Security
title_sort reykjavik summit and european security
publisher SAIS Review
publishDate 1987
url https://hdl.handle.net/10945/43333
genre Iceland
genre_facet Iceland
op_relation https://hdl.handle.net/10945/43333
op_rights This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
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