The Reykjavik Summit and European Security
Many West Europeans have agreed in retrospect that the most disturbing feature of the Reykjavik summit was the apparent "indifference or quasi-indifference" of the United States regarding European security interests. 1 This judgment is based on the specific arms-control arrangements that P...
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| Format: | Article in Journal/Newspaper |
| Language: | unknown |
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SAIS Review
1987
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10945/43333 |
| Summary: | Many West Europeans have agreed in retrospect that the most disturbing feature of the Reykjavik summit was the apparent "indifference or quasi-indifference" of the United States regarding European security interests. 1 This judgment is based on the specific arms-control arrangements that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed in Iceland in October 1986, plus the subsequent explanations of the U.S. administration. The Reykjavik summit also provided fresh evidence of the Soviet Union's more imaginative diplomatic style under Gorbachev and, more substantively, of enduring Soviet preferences regarding security in Europe. |
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