On the Problem of Sustainable Economic Development: A Theoretical Solution to this Prisoner's Dilemma

This paper offers a solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, and a universal theory of value. We introduce axioms which serve as the first of two derivations of our solution, our methods, the origin and evolution of our theory, field notes from Mustique, Iceland, and Prince Edwar...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Funk, Matt
Format: Report
Language:English
Published: 2008
Subjects:
Online Access:https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19025/
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19025/1/MPRA_paper_19025.pdf
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Summary:This paper offers a solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, and a universal theory of value. We introduce axioms which serve as the first of two derivations of our solution, our methods, the origin and evolution of our theory, field notes from Mustique, Iceland, and Prince Edward Island, and set the stage for a more thorough discourse. Next we demonstrate that value (V) is a derivative function of relative insularity (IR): V=f´(IR), then model economic development by dividing the world into geo-political islands: Relatively Insular States (RIS), and Global Economic Military Superpowers (GEMS). Our axioms deduce two opposing development strategies: Maximum Economic Development (MED), and Maximum Ecological Preservation (MEP). We clarify this by applying our Theory of Value within geo-political contexts which reveal divergent, optimizing strategies for GEMS and RIS economic development. We discover GEMS and RIS strategies are antithetical, yet also discover these naturally opposing strategies represent the most tenable, rational solution-set possible. In light of the inherent and inescapable planetary uncertainties our axiom reveal, we discover the optimal RIS strategy = MEP and GEMS = MED. We note our solution represents the Prisoner's Dilemma. We also note, that, ceteris paribus, based upon revealed 20th and 21st century preferences, RIS strategy has been suboptimal/irrational. Strategic Equilibrium is attained when players pursue respective rational, opposing development strategies. Equilibrium, however, offers windfalls: surplus value is created (RIS-driven ecological preservation, and GEMS-driven Global Security and Planetary Protection). In essence, this non-cooperative, strategic equilibrium paves the way for rational, mutually beneficial, cooperative behaviour, and yields surplus ecological and planetary insularities, and thus surplus economic and biologic value: RIS cooperate, form coalitions, and struggle for greater ecological insularity (ecological preservation). At the same time, ...