Principals and stewards? An exploration of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance

International audience The role of institutional investors in corporate governance has significantly increased. Many agency theory scholars have even praised the monitoring influence they have or could have on corporations and executive managers. Yet, recently, there have been repeated calls in favo...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Belinga, Rachelle, Segrestin, Blanche
Other Authors: Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 (CGS i3), Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation (I3), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Format: Conference Object
Language:English
Published: HAL CCSD 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:https://minesparis-psl.hal.science/hal-01791931
https://minesparis-psl.hal.science/hal-01791931v2/document
https://minesparis-psl.hal.science/hal-01791931v2/file/Belinga%20Segrestin%202018%20EUram.pdf
Description
Summary:International audience The role of institutional investors in corporate governance has significantly increased. Many agency theory scholars have even praised the monitoring influence they have or could have on corporations and executive managers. Yet, recently, there have been repeated calls in favour of investor " stewardship ". Drawing on a multidisciplinary review and on legal and regulatory materials, this article proposes an exploration of the concept of institutional investor stewardship. We provide a genealogical analysis of institutional investor stewardship that suggests that shareholder stewardship proceeds from the disparity between usual theoretical representations of shareholders and the rising influence of institutional ownership. We make two contributions. First, we contribute to the debate surrounding the role of institutional investors with an analysis of the emergence of renewed standards for institutional investors. Second, we contribute by clarifying the specific representation of shareholders, which was implied in traditional corporate governance models.