| Summary: | Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2010. Philosophy Includes bibliographical references (leaves 150-153) This thesis seeks to present an account of Kant's Metaphysical Expositions that shows them to be a model of philosophical reasoning in a mode that functions beyond sheer adversarial dispute. According to this account, agreement on the metaphysical status of the concepts of space and time requires different philosophical standpoints to set aside their strict foundational differences so that they might work corroboratively. The transcendental turn provides the opportunity for these otherwise philosophically diverse standpoints to work from such agreed unity to consensus regarding the ground of the concepts of space and time. However, so that there might actually be corroboration, the differences of these individual standpoints need, in some sense, to be respected. If not then the corroborative account provided is merely ceremonial. Therefore, the structure which permits the unity of these positions must also permit these individual philosophical voices to retain their distinct character. It is the aim of this thesis to examine this structure and to examine the importance of such a structure for the first two sections of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The conclusion of this thesis will suggest that although Kant's account is consistent, it is nevertheless a limited conception of the problem. Because Kant's solution to indifferentism is limited, the standpoint of indifferentism threatens to return.
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