| Summary: | Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2010. Philosophy Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-82) Philosophical theories of the self differ about exactly which concerns, aims and insights best promote the discovery of their object. One unambiguous and effective criterion with which to evaluate any such theory, regardless of whatever other first principles or final commitments the theory may possess, is to consider its treatment of (and its constraints, if any, upon) how and to what extent the self can know itself. In this thesis, I aim to uncover the reasons why David Hume (1711-1776) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), for sometimes differing and sometimes similar reasons, limit the self’s ability to reflect upon and to know itself. I argue that the theories advanced by Hume and Husserl are best understood in combination with a model of self-perception that is compatible and complementary with the letter and spirit of their general philosophies and is also already implied in Hume's bundle theory of the self.
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