Može li racionalnost biti iracionalna? Martin Heidegger i kazivanje istine

• Main Author: Kordić, Ivan; Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia; [e-mail]
• Format: Text
• Language: Croatian
• Published: Institute of Philosophy and Theology of Society of Jesus 2009
• Subjects: um; metafizika; istina; razumijevanje; racionalizam; teorija; konstrukcije; mind; metaphysics; truth; understanding; rationalism; theory; constructions; sami
• Online Access: http://hrcak.srce.hr/41179; http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/64582

Martin Heidegger je jedan od onih mislilaca koji ono što jest pokušava misliti prije svega na fenomenološki način. Ono što jest treba se sa svoje strane pokazati kako jest. Pritom on ne ostaje izoliran u svom svijetu, nego konzultira misaonu prošlost, koja se artikulirala u filozofiji, odnosno u metafizici. On je promišlja «destruirajući» je u smislu iznalaženja njezinih korijena. Pritom je uvjeren da se ona u svom povijesnom hodu sve više udaljava od svojih grčkih početaka, zaboravlja istinski bitak i gubi se u mišljenju bića, što je u novom vijeku vodi prema apsolutiziranju čovjeka kao subjekta, kojemu sve postaje objekt spoznaje i djelovanja. Takvo mišljenje je podleglo i apsolutiziranju uma, gubljenju iz vida njegovih osjećaja i raspoloženja, vremenitosti i konačnosti pri razumijevanju čovjeka. Pritom se istina promatra isključivo kao slaganje čovjekova uma, njegova suda, sa stvari. A što je stvar, određuje sami taj um, koji se tako vrti u krugu i ne pušta da ono što jest doista bude ono što jest. Sve ovo dovelo je i do toga da se mišljenje pretvaralo u spoznajno-teorijske konstrukcije, u apsolutiziranje subjektivističkog objektiviranja na štetu uvijek mogućega drukčijeg kazivanja stvarne istine bitka. Stoga se ponekad čini da se taj logičko-filozofijski racionalizam iscrpljuje u istraživanju koliko je riba u stanju živjeti na suhome, pa se ne čini apsurdnim upitati se može li «racionalnost» ipak biti iracionalna - u smislu ideološkog apsolutiziranja onoga racionalnog. Martin Heidegger is one of those thinkers who attempts to reflect on that which is (being) in a phenomenological way. That which is (being) should manifest itself as it is. In so doing, Heidegger does not remain isolated in his own world, instead he consults ideas from past ages as articulated in philosophy, that is, in metaphysics. He reflects upon metaphysics by «destroying» it in the sense that he fathoms its roots. He is convinced thereby that, in its historical walk, metaphysics has become increasingly estranged from its Greek beginnings, it has forgotten the true nature of being and is now lost in reflection upon the being. In the modern era this deviation has resulted in the absolutization of man as the subject to whom all things have become mere objects of cognition and activity. This manner of thinking has lead to the absolutization of reason, and at the same time to a failure to perceive emotion and mood, temporality and finiteness in understanding the human being. Truth is thus seen exclusively as the correspondence between the mind (judgement) and matter. Since the nature of matter is determined by the mind itself, the mind revolves in a circle and does not permit that which is to actually be what it is. Finally, intellectual reflection has mutated into cognitive-theoretical constructions and into the absolutization of subjectivistic objectivization at the expense of the ever-present possibility of expressing differently the real truth of being. Therefore it sometimes seems that such logical-philosophical rationalism exhausts itself in investigating how long a fish is able to live on dry land. Consequently, it does not seem absurd to ask oneself whether «rationality» might yet be irrational (irrational in the sense of an ideological absolutization of the rational).