Đavo je izvanustavni suveren

• Main Author: Rodin, Davor; Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia; [e-mail]
• Format: Text
• Language: Croatian
• Published: Faculty of Political Science 2002
• Subjects: đavo; ustav; nacionalna država; legitimitet; Europska Unija; demokracija; the Devil; constitution; national state; legitimacy; European Union; democracy; Kad’; sami
• Online Access: http://hrcak.srce.hr/24225; http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/38203

Ne treba imati iluzija da će dobar demokratski usvojen ustav jamčiti dobru i pravednu vladavinu u državi. Ustav građanima ne propisuje što trebaju činiti nego kako moraju djelovati da bi bili politički jedni drugima razumljivi. Ustav je u tom smislu sličan gramatici i ona ne naređuje što moramo pisati i govoriti, nego kako moramo pisati i govoriti da bi jedni drugima bili razumljivi. Budući da se đavo ne drži ustava, niti ga je na to moguće prisiliti, izvršen je u teoriji pokušaj da se ustav ne reducira na pozitivni zakon kojega se đavo ionako ne pridržava, nego da ustav ostane otvoreno pravilo koje se oslanja na običaje i političku kulturu građana tako da oni umjesto đavla uzmognu, zlu ne trebalo, sami tumačiti ustav, ali ga i promijeniti kad više ne jamči pravednu političku komunikaciju među građanima. One should not have any illusions: a good and democratically adopted constitution does not necessarily guarantee a good and fair government of a state. Constitutions do not dictate to citizens what they are supposed to do but how they must act in order to be politically comprehensible to one another. In that sense, constitutions are similar to grammar: it does not prescribe what but how we must write and talk in order to be understood by others. Since the Devil does not abide by constitutions, nor can he be forced to respect them, there has been a theoretical attempt to reduce constitutions not to the positive laws spurned by the Devil but to the open rules relying on the citizens’ customs and their political culture so that they – and not the Devil – may, just in case, interpret constitutions themselves and also alter them when they do no longer guarantee a fair political communication among citizens.