Specification Faithfulness in Networks with Rational Nodes
It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores how to create distributed system specifications that will be faithfully implemented in networks with...
| Published in: | Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing - PODC '04 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Other/Unknown Material |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery
2004
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4054443 https://doi.org/10.1145/1011767.1011781 |
| Summary: | It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores how to create distributed system specifications that will be faithfully implemented in networks with rational nodes, so that no node will choose to deviate. Given a strategyproof centralized mechanism, and given a network of nodes modeled as having rational-manipulation faults, we provide a proof technique to establish the incentive-, communication-, and algorithm-compatibility properties that guarantee that participating nodes are faithful to a suggested specification. As a case study, we apply our methods to extend the strategyproof interdomain routing mechanism proposed by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker (FPSS) [7], defining a faithful implementation. Engineering and Applied Sciences Accepted Manuscript |
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