Description
Summary:In response to political developments in Taiwan, the Bush Administration is widely seen to have dialed back its initial public enthusiasm for supporting Taiwan initiatives, particularly those seen as provocative or as challenges to what the U.S. Government understands as the "status quo." While still pursuing a closer U.S. relationship with Taiwan, U.S. officials now appear to be balancing criticisms of the PRC military buildup opposite Taiwan with warnings to Taiwan that some of its actions are "unhelpful" and that U.S. support for Taiwan is not unconditional, but has limits. This represents a marked departure from the early days of the Bush Administration, when the White House seemed to abandon the long-standing U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity" on Taiwan in favor of "strategic clarity" that placed more emphasis on Taiwan's interests and less on PRC concerns. Among other things, President Bush approved a substantial sale of U.S. weapons to Taiwan (in April 2001) and was more willing than previous U.S. presidents to approve visas for visits from Taiwan officials. This initial policy approach was in keeping with growing congressional sentiment that greater U.S. support was needed for Taiwan's defense needs, particularly given the PRC's military build-up in southern China. Since then, U.S.-Taiwan relations have undergone important changes, sparked in part by the increasing complexity and unpredictability of Taiwan's democratic political environment. Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, a member of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has disavowed key concepts long embraced by the formerly ruling Nationalist Party (KMT), and instead has adopted the more provocative position that Taiwan already "is an independent, sovereign country." This, combined with a series of corruption scandals involving Chen's administration and family members, has led to record-low approval ratings for, and a growing political outcry against, President Chen. CRS Report for Congress.