Description
Summary:Early in its tenure, the George W. Bush Administration seemed to abandon the long-standing U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity" on Taiwan in favor of "strategic clarity" that placed more emphasis on Taiwan's interests and less on PRC concerns. Among other things, President Bush publicly stated in 2001 that the United States would do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan's defense and approved, in April 2001, a substantial sale of U.S. weapons to Taiwan. The White House also was more accommodating to visits from Taiwan officials than previous U.S. Administrations. This initially assertive posture was in keeping with growing congressional sentiment that greater U.S. support was needed for Taiwan's defense needs, particularly given the PRC's military build-up in southern China. Since then, U.S.-Taiwan relations have undergone important changes, sparked in part by the increasing complexity and unpredictability of Taiwan's democratic political environment. The once-ruling Nationalist Party (KMT) has been handed a series of stunning defeats, losing both the presidency and its legislative majority to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Taiwan's President, Chen Shui-bian, has disavowed key concepts long embraced by his KMT opponents and instead has adopted the more provocative position that Taiwan already "is an independent, sovereign country." Many in the electorate appear wary of the more strident and confrontational aspects of President Chen's political positions. This, combined with a series of recent corruption scandals involving Chen's administration and family members, has led to record-low approval ratings for President Chen and a growing political outcry against him. These political trends have raised anxieties about the prospects for a future political and constitutional crisis in Taiwan that could further complicate U.S. policy. In response, the Bush Administration appears to have dialed back its earlier public enthusiasm for supporting Taiwan initiatives. CRS Report for Congress.