Maritime Homeland Security and Defense: Who's in Charge? A Current C2 Perspective

A significant outcome of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, was the major reorganization of the U.S. Government to reprioritize the nation's focus on homeland defense and homeland security, specifically with the creation of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Department of Ho...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: TEN Hoopen, Douglas J.
Other Authors: NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
Format: Text
Language:English
Published: 2003
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA420263
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA420263
Description
Summary:A significant outcome of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, was the major reorganization of the U.S. Government to reprioritize the nation's focus on homeland defense and homeland security, specifically with the creation of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Although terrorists have the potential for delivering their attacks from three dimensions (air, land, and sea), this paper addresses the maritime domain dimension, with a specific focus on the C2 structure. The difference between homeland defense and homeland security is articulated to manifest the different missions assigned to DoD and the new DHS. With the Navy and Coast Guard as the primary maritime forces in these roles, they need to be able to operate jointly, in a seamless manner, and with the assistance of multiple external agencies. Interagency cooperation with an unhampered unity of effort, along with a robust command, control, and communications (C3) capability are just a few requirements needed to effectively carry out the homeland security and defense missions. An unfinished C2 construct, an aged Coast Guard inventory, and new requirements placed on an already heavily tasked Navy are just some examples of the issues facing these new organizations as they continue to stand up and grasp the full scope of their responsibilities. The most important focus needs to be the completion of the C2 organizational construct - a task that should already have been completed and incorporated - so that a commander can be identified and his or her intent can be communicated to the lower echelons so that the maritime domain is properly secured and defended. (4 figures, 39 refs.)