What are the Effects of Arms Control on Norway and Northern Waters?

Norway occupies a strategic position between the two superpowers. Her close proximity to the Soviet Union and the military bases on the Kola Peninsula make her territory attractive to both NATO and the Soviet Union. Buildups of the Soviet North Fleet and the naval base on Kola and the United States...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Furnes, Reidar H.
Other Authors: AIR WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL
Format: Text
Language:English
Published: 1990
Subjects:
Government and Political Science
Military Operations
Strategy and Tactics
*NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NUCLEAR FORCES(MILITARY)
USSR
NATO
DEPLOYMENT
FORWARD AREAS
MILITARY FACILITIES
MILITARY STRATEGY
UNITED STATES
POLICIES
WATER
NAVY
SECURITY
SHIFTING
STRATEGIC WEAPONS
PROTECTION
FLEETS(SHIPS)
ARMS CONTROL
NORTH(DIRECTION)
STRATEGIC WARFARE
TREATIES
NORWAY
SUBMARINES
SUBMARINE LAUNCHED
LAND AREAS
SEA LAUNCHED
PENINSULAS
GUIDED MISSILES
*ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS
DISARMAMENT
Kola Peninsula
Norway
kola peninsula
Online Access:http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA241091
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA241091
Description
Summary:Norway occupies a strategic position between the two superpowers. Her close proximity to the Soviet Union and the military bases on the Kola Peninsula make her territory attractive to both NATO and the Soviet Union. Buildups of the Soviet North Fleet and the naval base on Kola and the United States naval strategy of forward deployment, have increased the activity and the importance of northern waters. This increased importance of northern waters could challenge the Norwegian security policy. Arms reduction could make Norwegian territory relatively more important for the Soviet Union to defend her interests on Kola and in northern waters and for the United States to project a threat to the Soviet interests in the area. (1) A reduction of strategic nuclear missile forces will focus on survivability. Northern waters offers excellent protection to Soviet submarines. A relative shift to SLBM could be the result of reducing the strategic nuclear missile forces. (2) The INF does not comprise sea launched intermediate nuclear missiles. Hence the elimination of land-based intermediate nuclear forces could cause a shift to sea launched nuclear missiles. START negotiations and the INF treaty could relatively increase the number of sea based strategic and intermediate nuclear forces which would relatively increase the activity and the importance of northern waters. Thus, Norway and her security policy would be affected.

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