Environmental-economic system of bioresource use with asymmetric agents

A discrete time game-theoretic model of an environmental-economic system is considered. Agents (firms or fishermen’s artel cooperatives) that exploit the fish stock on a finite planning horizon are the participants of the game. The agents have different exploitation times. The main goal of the paper...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Proceedings of the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Main Author: Anna Rettieva
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:English
Russian
Published: Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences 2016
Subjects:
bioresource management problem
asymmetric players
nash bargaining solution
Science
Q
Nash
Republic of Karelia
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.17076/mat441
https://doaj.org/article/8914acdb0d054e0095f49b4df1c69371
Description
Summary:A discrete time game-theoretic model of an environmental-economic system is considered. Agents (firms or fishermen’s artel cooperatives) that exploit the fish stock on a finite planning horizon are the participants of the game. The agents have different exploitation times. The main goal of the paper is to construct the cooperative behavior of the participants and to apply the presented setup for wise use of aquatic bioresources of the Republic of Karelia.

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