| Summary: | Tiris artide examines why and to what extent the degree of conflict that exists between state executives and the opposition in state legislatures (measured by the presence or absence of divided government), and the degree of fragmentation of partisan interests in state legislatures (measured by legislative fragmentation) alter the magnitude of state expenditures in Mexico. The study finds that both the presence of a divided government and the degree of legislative fragmentation do affect the magnitude of public expenditures executed by Mexican states. However, we also veruy that part of the impact of either of these factors on state public expenditures depends on the impact of the other. In otherwords, increases in the effective number oflegislative parties boost public expenditures when the party ruling the state executive does not hold more than fifty percent of seats in the state legislature. These effects on state spending are meaningful and statistically significant, and confirm the hypotheses of this study. This contribution does not only expand our understanding on the role of state legislatures in the scope of expenditures of state legislatures, butalso offers information on why and towhat extent legislative fragmentation is able to influence public policy Este artfculo examina par qué y en qué medida el antagonisrrw que existe entre, par un lado, el Ejecutivo estatal y la oposicifm (la presencia de una mayoría de asientos del partido que controla el Ejecutivo estatal) y, por el otro, la fragmentación de intereses partidarios (fragmentación legislativa), altera la magnitud del gasto estatal en México. Este estudio sostiene y muestra que la presencia de gobierno dividido en el gobierno estatal (minoría del partido del gobernador en la legislatura estatal) y el grado de fragmentación legislativa afectan el gasto público estatal. También comprobarrws que parte del impacto de cualquiera de estos dos factores sobre el gasto público estatal está condicionado al efecto del otro factor. Al respedo, ...
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