Stikkord:
Summary: A two-stage, two-player non-cooperative game model is developed under an irreversible capital investment assumption. The main aim is to prediet the number of vessels that each player in such a game wil find in his best interest to employ in the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock,...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
1994
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.579.8291 http://bora.cmi.no/dspace/bitstream/10202/354/1/WP1994.2 Ussif-07192007_6.pdf |
| Summary: | Summary: A two-stage, two-player non-cooperative game model is developed under an irreversible capital investment assumption. The main aim is to prediet the number of vessels that each player in such a game wil find in his best interest to employ in the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock, given a non-cooperative environment and the fact that all players are jointly constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. The predictions obtained are then compared with (i) the sole owner's optimal capacity investments for the two players; (ii) the results in Sumaila (1994), where perfect malleabilty of c ap aci t y is assumed implicitly; and (iii) available data on the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery. Sammendrag: Et to-steg to-aktør ikke-kooperativt spil er utviklet under en antagelse om irreversibel kapital investering. Hovedmålet er å finne antall fiskebåter som hver aktør finner i sin egen interesse å sette inn for å høste av den norsk arktiske torsken, gitt begrensninger i ressurstilgangen og at aktørene ikke samarbeider. Resultatene som framkommer er sammenliknet med (1) resultatet når bare en av aktørene har rettigheten til ressursen, (2) resultatene i Sumaila (1994) |
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