A theory of coalitions and clientelism: Coalition politics
democracies. The political landscape of Iceland is surveyed, as is the institutional framework that structures the formation of coalitions, coalition governance and cabinet termination while providing complete data for each cabinet. Second, the effects clientelism has on coali-tion politics through...
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| Format: | Text |
| Language: | English |
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2005
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| Online Access: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.579.1265 http://www.politicaldata.org/Indridason/Publications/Indridason, I - Coalition formation in Iceland EJPR.pdf |
| Summary: | democracies. The political landscape of Iceland is surveyed, as is the institutional framework that structures the formation of coalitions, coalition governance and cabinet termination while providing complete data for each cabinet. Second, the effects clientelism has on coali-tion politics through the inflated importance of the executive office are considered. The pat-terns of coalition politics in the Nordic countries are compared to offer preliminary evidence supporting the theory. Coalition politics have received little attention in the study of Icelandic poli-tics, with only Grímsson (1977, 1982) covering coalition formation. Coalition formation in Iceland appears more competitive than in most of Western Europe. The contrast with the Nordic countries is especially stark. This is somewhat surprising because of a tendency to emphasize the similarities of the Nordic countries, but can be explained in part by the fact that Icelandic politics are rooted in clientelism. Clientelistic politics focuses on the delivery of particularistic benefits rather than public policies. The prevalence of clientelistic politics depends on |
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