the World Trade Organization, the European Union, the North Atlantic
Why have major powers chosen to implement unanimity voting to decide on accession in many international institutions, even though it allows weak states to blackmail the powerful into providing costly side payments? We argue that unanimity voting can profit major powers by creating uncertainty as to...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2009
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.550.7205 http://www.imtlucca.it/_kbase/seminar_paper/006533_000259_.pdf |
| Summary: | Why have major powers chosen to implement unanimity voting to decide on accession in many international institutions, even though it allows weak states to blackmail the powerful into providing costly side payments? We argue that unanimity voting can profit major powers by creating uncertainty as to the minimal level of reform that enables accession. Specifically, our formal analysis of accession negotiations shows that if accession is valuable enough and the applicant is un-certain as to the resolve of weak member states, the applicant plays safe by implementing ambitious reforms that ultimately improve the efficacy of the international institution. Empirically, these predictions are consistent with the widening of such international institutions as |
|---|