Sequential exporting

Firms need to incur substantial sunk costs to break in foreign markets, yet many give up exporting shortly after their �rst experience, which typically involves very small sales. Conversely, other new exporters shoot up their foreign sales and expand to new destinations. We investigate a simple theo...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Facundo Albornoz, Héctor F. Calvo Pardo, Emanuel Ornelas, Gregory Corcos
Other Authors: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
Format: Text
Language:English
Published: 2012
Subjects:
L21
F13
F15
Online Access:http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.408.6932
http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/IMG/pdf/CEPII-PSE-paper2-060710.pdf
Description
Summary:Firms need to incur substantial sunk costs to break in foreign markets, yet many give up exporting shortly after their �rst experience, which typically involves very small sales. Conversely, other new exporters shoot up their foreign sales and expand to new destinations. We investigate a simple theoretical mechanism that can rationalize these patterns. A �rm discovers its pro�tability as exporter only after actually engaging in exporting. The pro�tability is positively correlated over time and across destinations. Accordingly, once the �rm learns how good it is as an exporter, it adjusts quantities and decides whether to exit and whether to serve new destinations. Thus, it is the possibility of pro�table expansion at both the intensive and extensive margins what makes incurring the sunk costs to enter a single foreign market worthwhile despite the high failure rates. Using a census of Argentinean �rm-level manufacturing exports from 2002 to 2007, we �nd empirical support for several implications of our proposed mechanism, indicating that the practice of “sequential exporting ” is pervasive. Sequential exporting has broad but subtle implications for trade policy. For example, a reduction in trade barriers in a country has delayed entry e�ects in its own market, while also promoting entry in other markets. This trade externality poses challenges for the quanti�cation of the e�ects of trade liberalization programs, while suggesting neglected but critical implications of international trade agreements.