Homo Æqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games ∗

• Main Authors: Abigail Barr A, Chris Wallace B, Jean Ensminger C, Joseph Henrich D, Clark Barrett E, Er Bolyanatz F, Juan Camilo Cardenas G, Michael Gurven H, Edwins Gwako I, Carolyn Lesorogol J, Frank Marlowe K, Richard Mcelreath L, David Tracer M, John Ziker N
• Other Authors: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
• Format: Text
• Language: English
• Published: 2009
• Subjects: Arctic
• Online Access: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.163.7815; http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2009-02text.pdf

Abstract. Data from three bargaining games—the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game—played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and Third-Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling. 1.