Homo Æqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games ∗
Abstract. Data from three bargaining games—the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game—played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across...
Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , , , , , , |
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Other Authors: | |
Format: | Text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2009
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.163.7815 http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2009-02text.pdf |
Summary: | Abstract. Data from three bargaining games—the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game—played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and Third-Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling. 1. |
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