ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In August of 2005, fishing in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Island crab fisheries began under a new sharebased management program (the “rationalization program”). Under the program, allocations of IFQ to harvesters and IPQ to processors are binding, without provision to cover any overage or compensate...
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| Format: | Text |
| Language: | English |
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2008
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| Online Access: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.153.8390 http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/analyses/amd28/amd28_rir_irfa.pdf |
| Summary: | In August of 2005, fishing in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Island crab fisheries began under a new sharebased management program (the “rationalization program”). Under the program, allocations of IFQ to harvesters and IPQ to processors are binding, without provision to cover any overage or compensate for any underage. This action considers allowing harvesters and processors to engage in post-delivery transfer of their respective shares to cover overages. Purpose and Need Statement The Council has adopted the following the purpose and need statement for this action: Under the crab rationalization program, harvesters receive annual allocations of individual fishing quota that provide an exclusive privilege to harvest a specific number of pounds of crab from a fishery. Any harvest in excess of an individual fishing quota allocation is a regulatory violation, punishable by confiscation of crab or other penalties. Precisely estimating catch at sea during the fishery is difficult and costly, due to variation in size of crab, and sorting and measurement requirements. Overages can result from mistakes, by participants attempting to accurately estimate catch. The inability to address overages also impedes flexibility in attempting to optimally harvest IFQ. A provision allowing for post-delivery transfer of individual fishing |
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