NONCOOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT OF THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC COD FISHERY: A FIRST MOVER ADVANTAGE
Abstract The point of departure for this analysis is Bjørndal and Lindroos [2012], who developed an empirical bioeconomic model to analyze cooperative and noncooperative management of Northeast Atlantic cod. In their analysis, only constant strategies were analyzed for noncooperative games. In this...
| Published in: | Natural Resource Modeling |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article in Journal/Newspaper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nrm.12040 https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fnrm.12040 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/nrm.12040 |
| Summary: | Abstract The point of departure for this analysis is Bjørndal and Lindroos [2012], who developed an empirical bioeconomic model to analyze cooperative and noncooperative management of Northeast Atlantic cod. In their analysis, only constant strategies were analyzed for noncooperative games. In this paper, nonconstant strategies are considered. Moreover, the fishery in question is characterized by cooperative management. What may happen in the real world is that one nation breaks the cooperative agreement by fishing in excess of its quota. Often, it takes time for the other agent to detect this and respond. In this paper, we allow this kind of delayed response into a two‐agent noncooperative game so that, if country 2 exceeds its quota, there will be a time lag before this is detected by country 1; moreover, there may also be a delay until country 1 is able to respond. Results show that the outcome critically depends on the length of these two lags as well as initial conditions. |
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