Government Formation in the Nordic Countries: The Electoral Connection

Government formation is guided by several principles, such as majority, plurality and electoral principles. According to the electoral principle, parties that increase their share of seats in the elections should form the government, parties that lose seats joining the opposition. We analyse the ful...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Scandinavian Political Studies
Main Authors: Mattila, Mikko, Raunio, Tapio
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2002
Subjects:
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.00071
https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2F1467-9477.00071
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9477.00071
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Summary:Government formation is guided by several principles, such as majority, plurality and electoral principles. According to the electoral principle, parties that increase their share of seats in the elections should form the government, parties that lose seats joining the opposition. We analyse the fulfilment of this principle in the five Nordic countries. In Denmark, Finland and Iceland the majority of governments contained parties that both won and lost in elections, whereas in Sweden nearly half of the governments included only parties that lost seats. Only in Iceland and Denmark does election success translate to an increased probability of a government place in an increasing way. In Norway and particularly in Sweden big losers have better chances of being in government than big winners. Party system attributes are not related to the fulfilment of the electoral principle. To shift our analysis to individual parties, prime ministers come more likely from parties that are big winners. Winning does not explain the probability of becoming a coalition partner. If a party wants to be in government it is more important to avoid losing seats than to be an actual winner. Coalition partners are more likely to be mid–sized parties, a finding probably explained by the desire of the formateur party to maximise its policy influence in the government.