Falklands War (1982)

Abstract The world awoke on April 3, 1982 to the shocking news that an Argentine invasion force had landed on the desolate Falkland Islands in the far South Atlantic, subdued the small force of Royal Marines stationed at the capital, Port Stanley, and proclaimed the islands nuestras —“our”—Malvinas...

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Main Author: Turner, Blair
Format: Other/Unknown Material
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2011
Subjects:
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191
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spelling crwiley:10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191 2024-06-02T08:14:31+00:00 Falklands War (1982) Turner, Blair 2011 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191 en eng Wiley http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 The Encyclopedia of War ISBN 9781405190374 9781444338232 other 2011 crwiley https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191 2024-05-03T11:32:28Z Abstract The world awoke on April 3, 1982 to the shocking news that an Argentine invasion force had landed on the desolate Falkland Islands in the far South Atlantic, subdued the small force of Royal Marines stationed at the capital, Port Stanley, and proclaimed the islands nuestras —“our”—Malvinas (Argentina would follow up with the capture of a tiny garrison on South Georgia Island that same day). No one except the invasion force and a few planners in the Argentine military staffs knew of the expedition until it was over. There had been long and drawn‐out discussions in the United Nations (UN) and other venues for decades about the contentious issue of sovereign control of the islands. Multiple conflicting claims dating back to the Seven Years' War of the eighteenth century ensured that both sides had established rather rigid positions: Britain in favor of “self‐determination” for the few settlers on the islands (Scots and Welsh) and the Argentines in favor of exclusive sovereignty over islands on the Argentine continental shelf, with guarantees of civil rights for the settlers as Argentine citizens. Even so, the notion of actual hostilities over the islands seemed remote. The Argentine plan was based on forcing a fait accompli . That the British would undertake the costly and huge operation necessary to recover the islands some 8,500 miles distant in the coming South Atlantic winter was deemed too unlikely; a negotiated settlement would be reached. Argentine planners understood, however, that defeat was a distinct probability if the British did fight. Other/Unknown Material South Georgia Island Wiley Online Library Argentina Argentine South Georgia Island ENVELOPE(-36.750,-36.750,-54.250,-54.250)
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collection Wiley Online Library
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description Abstract The world awoke on April 3, 1982 to the shocking news that an Argentine invasion force had landed on the desolate Falkland Islands in the far South Atlantic, subdued the small force of Royal Marines stationed at the capital, Port Stanley, and proclaimed the islands nuestras —“our”—Malvinas (Argentina would follow up with the capture of a tiny garrison on South Georgia Island that same day). No one except the invasion force and a few planners in the Argentine military staffs knew of the expedition until it was over. There had been long and drawn‐out discussions in the United Nations (UN) and other venues for decades about the contentious issue of sovereign control of the islands. Multiple conflicting claims dating back to the Seven Years' War of the eighteenth century ensured that both sides had established rather rigid positions: Britain in favor of “self‐determination” for the few settlers on the islands (Scots and Welsh) and the Argentines in favor of exclusive sovereignty over islands on the Argentine continental shelf, with guarantees of civil rights for the settlers as Argentine citizens. Even so, the notion of actual hostilities over the islands seemed remote. The Argentine plan was based on forcing a fait accompli . That the British would undertake the costly and huge operation necessary to recover the islands some 8,500 miles distant in the coming South Atlantic winter was deemed too unlikely; a negotiated settlement would be reached. Argentine planners understood, however, that defeat was a distinct probability if the British did fight.
format Other/Unknown Material
author Turner, Blair
spellingShingle Turner, Blair
Falklands War (1982)
author_facet Turner, Blair
author_sort Turner, Blair
title Falklands War (1982)
title_short Falklands War (1982)
title_full Falklands War (1982)
title_fullStr Falklands War (1982)
title_full_unstemmed Falklands War (1982)
title_sort falklands war (1982)
publisher Wiley
publishDate 2011
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191
long_lat ENVELOPE(-36.750,-36.750,-54.250,-54.250)
geographic Argentina
Argentine
South Georgia Island
geographic_facet Argentina
Argentine
South Georgia Island
genre South Georgia Island
genre_facet South Georgia Island
op_source The Encyclopedia of War
ISBN 9781405190374 9781444338232
op_rights http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1
op_doi https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191
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