Falklands War (1982)
Abstract The world awoke on April 3, 1982 to the shocking news that an Argentine invasion force had landed on the desolate Falkland Islands in the far South Atlantic, subdued the small force of Royal Marines stationed at the capital, Port Stanley, and proclaimed the islands nuestras —“our”—Malvinas...
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Format: | Other/Unknown Material |
Language: | English |
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Wiley
2011
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Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow191 |
Summary: | Abstract The world awoke on April 3, 1982 to the shocking news that an Argentine invasion force had landed on the desolate Falkland Islands in the far South Atlantic, subdued the small force of Royal Marines stationed at the capital, Port Stanley, and proclaimed the islands nuestras —“our”—Malvinas (Argentina would follow up with the capture of a tiny garrison on South Georgia Island that same day). No one except the invasion force and a few planners in the Argentine military staffs knew of the expedition until it was over. There had been long and drawn‐out discussions in the United Nations (UN) and other venues for decades about the contentious issue of sovereign control of the islands. Multiple conflicting claims dating back to the Seven Years' War of the eighteenth century ensured that both sides had established rather rigid positions: Britain in favor of “self‐determination” for the few settlers on the islands (Scots and Welsh) and the Argentines in favor of exclusive sovereignty over islands on the Argentine continental shelf, with guarantees of civil rights for the settlers as Argentine citizens. Even so, the notion of actual hostilities over the islands seemed remote. The Argentine plan was based on forcing a fait accompli . That the British would undertake the costly and huge operation necessary to recover the islands some 8,500 miles distant in the coming South Atlantic winter was deemed too unlikely; a negotiated settlement would be reached. Argentine planners understood, however, that defeat was a distinct probability if the British did fight. |
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