Constitution

Abstract In many cases, value tracks meaning. In particular, when some natural entity has value for us on account of its meaning, and that meaning depends on some context, y, then the entity’s value for us will typically depend on y. More precisely, the entity will be of constitutive value—of value,...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: James, Simon P.
Format: Book Part
Language:English
Published: Oxford University PressOxford 2022
Subjects:
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198871613.003.0006
https://academic.oup.com/book/chapter-pdf/57987655/oso-9780198871613-chapter-6.pdf
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Summary:Abstract In many cases, value tracks meaning. In particular, when some natural entity has value for us on account of its meaning, and that meaning depends on some context, y, then the entity’s value for us will typically depend on y. More precisely, the entity will be of constitutive value—of value, that is, because it is part of, rather than a means to, y. This part–whole model of value sheds light on the case studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4. In each of those cases, some natural entity has value because it contributes (though not of course intentionally) to some meaningful whole which, in turn, qualifies as valuable by virtue of its links with human well-being. Take the example of the Saami’s reindeer. The reindeer play an important role in the Saami’s cultural identity. If, as seems likely, their having that identity contributes to their well-being, then, by the lights of the part–whole model, the reindeer have constitutive value for the Saami. This conception of constitutive value is then compared with three other kinds of value—namely, (1) value for us, (2) value all things considered, and (3) aesthetic value.