Keeping the americans in, the russians out, and the germans down, 1949
Abstract The event in 1949 that assured Acheson’s place as Truman’s primary guide and adviser in foreign policy was not the conclusion of the North Atlantic alliance in April. Instead, it was the four-power discussion of Germany in May and June at the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in Paris. Ach...
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| Format: | Book Part |
| Language: | unknown |
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Oxford University PressNew York, NY
2006
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| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195045789.003.0008 https://academic.oup.com/book/chapter-pdf/52492630/isbn-9780195045789-book-part-8.pdf |
| Summary: | Abstract The event in 1949 that assured Acheson’s place as Truman’s primary guide and adviser in foreign policy was not the conclusion of the North Atlantic alliance in April. Instead, it was the four-power discussion of Germany in May and June at the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in Paris. Acheson’s success at the CFM session greatly solidified his authority in the administration and his leadership in foreign affairs. The measure he took of the Soviets’ intentions in Paris reinforced his view that there was really no point in talking to them. The conference also sealed his conversion to the view that the west could not risk losing the western occupation zones of Germany but must integrate them into the west, making West Germany part of the western alliance. Finally, it marked a further evolution of Acheson’s overall cold war strategy. He not only wanted the west to be strong enough to contain the Kremlin. To win the cold war, he thought the west must have superior strength. Continuing discord with Moscow, he came to believe, was less risky than ongoing negotiations with it. |
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