Is national transferable quota an economic policy option?
Examines one of the hypothetical economic policy options for international fisheries management, namely a national transferable quota (NTQ). Special emphasis will be placed on an examination of the voluntary agreement on the Antarctic whaling quota in 1962, as well as the trend in recent southern bl...
| Published in: | International Journal of Social Economics |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article in Journal/Newspaper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Emerald
1996
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03068299610121903 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full-xml/10.1108/03068299610121903 https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/03068299610121903/full/xml https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/03068299610121903/full/html |
| Summary: | Examines one of the hypothetical economic policy options for international fisheries management, namely a national transferable quota (NTQ). Special emphasis will be placed on an examination of the voluntary agreement on the Antarctic whaling quota in 1962, as well as the trend in recent southern bluefin tuna (SBT) fisheries. An examination of the Antarctic whaling agreement, from a standpoint of economic efficiency, indicates that the 1962 agreement resulted in Pareto improvement. The trend in recent SBT fisheries also shows the economic rationalization between Japan, Australia and New Zealand. These events indicate that NTQ as an economic policy option has been unconsciously applied in international management systems in order to achieve mutual and effective agreement among the countries. It is, however, important to consider the possibility of an international monopolistic supply situation if the decision makers decide to implement this option. Discusses the possibility of third‐degree price discrimination in relation to the SBT. |
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