Have Elephant Seals Refuted Aristotle? Nature, Function, and Moral Goodness
An influential strand of neo-Aristotelianism, represented by writers such as Philippa Foot, holds that moral virtue is a form of natural goodness in human beings, analogous to deep roots in oak trees or keen vision in hawks. Critics, however, have argued that such a view cannot get off the ground, b...
| Published in: | Journal of Moral Philosophy |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article in Journal/Newspaper |
| Language: | unknown |
| Published: |
Brill
2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552412x625727 https://brill.com/view/journals/jmp/9/3/article-p353_4.xml https://data.brill.com/files/journals/17455243_009_03_S04_text.pdf |
| Summary: | An influential strand of neo-Aristotelianism, represented by writers such as Philippa Foot, holds that moral virtue is a form of natural goodness in human beings, analogous to deep roots in oak trees or keen vision in hawks. Critics, however, have argued that such a view cannot get off the ground, because the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity is untenable in light of a Darwinian account of living things. This criticism has been developed most fully by William Fitzpatrick in his book Teleology and the Norms of Nature . In this paper, I defend the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity, focusing on Fitzpatrick’s arguments. I argue that a natural goodness view is not impugned by an evolutionary account. Nor can neo-Aristotelian life form judgments be replaced by an evolutionary view of living things. |
|---|