Why do some institutional arrangements succeed? Voluntary protection of forest biodiversity in Southwestern Finland and of the Golden Eagle in Finnish Lapland

• Published in: Nature Conservation
• Main Authors: Hiedanpää, Juha, Borgström, Suvi
• Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
• Language: unknown
• Published: Zenodo 2014
• Subjects: Environmental law; Institutional economics; Biodiversity conservation; Economic instruments: Payments for ecosystem services; Pragmatism; Aquila chrysaetos; golden eagle; Lapland
• Online Access: https://doi.org/10.3897/natureconservation.7.6497

Despite global, regional, and national policy efforts, biodiversity is on the decline worldwide. The purpose of this paper is to explore the critically important institutional and social features of those economic instruments that in practice motivate beneficiaries and stakeholders to protect biodiversity. The paper presents two case studies: the natural values trading (NVT) scheme in southwestern Finland and the protection of the golden eagle ( Aquila chrysaetos ) in Finnish Lapland. NVT builds upon the voluntary actions of landowners, payments for ecosystem services, and a fixed-term period of protection (ten years). The protection of the golden eagle is based on tolerance payments. This paper combines legal studies and institutional economics to abduct the reasons underlying the success of both cases. In both cases, institutional entrepreneurship promoted the confidence of stakeholders and beneficiaries in the schemes and the consequent trust amongst the agents encouraged the actors to modify their behaviour.