Russia in the Arctic: Development plans, military potential, and conflict prevention

Russia wants to realise a high degree of self-regulated stability in the Arctic. Moscow considers this necessary for overcoming the many problems and obstacles to development that are linked to its ambitious plans as well as the consequences of climate change. The regression of sea ice is perceived...

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Main Authors: Paul, Michael, Swistek, Göran
Format: Report
Language:English
Published: Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) 2022
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/253246
https://doi.org/10.18449/2022RP03
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spelling ftzbwkiel:oai:econstor.eu:10419/253246 2024-01-07T09:40:59+01:00 Russia in the Arctic: Development plans, military potential, and conflict prevention Paul, Michael Swistek, Göran 2022 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/253246 https://doi.org/10.18449/2022RP03 eng eng Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Series: SWP Research Paper No. 3/2022 gbv-ppn:1788309839 doi:10.18449/2022RP03 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/253246 RePEc:zbw:swprps:32022 http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen ddc:320 doc-type:report 2022 ftzbwkiel https://doi.org/10.18449/2022RP03 2023-12-11T00:47:26Z Russia wants to realise a high degree of self-regulated stability in the Arctic. Moscow considers this necessary for overcoming the many problems and obstacles to development that are linked to its ambitious plans as well as the consequences of climate change. The regression of sea ice is perceived as a loss of security by the Kremlin, which reinforces its traditional siege mentality. Russian foreign policy is shaped by a reflexive priorisation of security policy above all, even in the Arctic region. Moscow tries to guarantee its national security (including economic interests) by using a broad spectrum of military build-up and corresponding strategic initiatives, which include new nuclear weapons systems. Other Arctic states as well as neighbouring countries and NATO consider these efforts a threat. Russia takes a defensive attitude in the Arctic, but it is prepared for rapid escalation in the event of confrontation. Russia's Arctic policy is a part of its strategy for exerting economic and political influence over Europe. Cooperation between its Northern and Baltic fleets is therefore increasingly important to preserve its geostrategic interests, project power and to defend its territory. The Arctic states have to perform a delicate balancing act: they want to secure sea routes and resources but avoid spiralling escalation in the region. The dialogue on military security should be revived in order to contain the consequences of the security dilemma. Opportunities for cooperation do exist, for example on climate and environmental projects, sustainable and environmentally sound energy use, infrastructure, maritime safety and security as well as economic cooperation. Report Arctic Climate change Sea ice EconStor (German National Library of Economics, ZBW) Arctic
institution Open Polar
collection EconStor (German National Library of Economics, ZBW)
op_collection_id ftzbwkiel
language English
topic ddc:320
spellingShingle ddc:320
Paul, Michael
Swistek, Göran
Russia in the Arctic: Development plans, military potential, and conflict prevention
topic_facet ddc:320
description Russia wants to realise a high degree of self-regulated stability in the Arctic. Moscow considers this necessary for overcoming the many problems and obstacles to development that are linked to its ambitious plans as well as the consequences of climate change. The regression of sea ice is perceived as a loss of security by the Kremlin, which reinforces its traditional siege mentality. Russian foreign policy is shaped by a reflexive priorisation of security policy above all, even in the Arctic region. Moscow tries to guarantee its national security (including economic interests) by using a broad spectrum of military build-up and corresponding strategic initiatives, which include new nuclear weapons systems. Other Arctic states as well as neighbouring countries and NATO consider these efforts a threat. Russia takes a defensive attitude in the Arctic, but it is prepared for rapid escalation in the event of confrontation. Russia's Arctic policy is a part of its strategy for exerting economic and political influence over Europe. Cooperation between its Northern and Baltic fleets is therefore increasingly important to preserve its geostrategic interests, project power and to defend its territory. The Arctic states have to perform a delicate balancing act: they want to secure sea routes and resources but avoid spiralling escalation in the region. The dialogue on military security should be revived in order to contain the consequences of the security dilemma. Opportunities for cooperation do exist, for example on climate and environmental projects, sustainable and environmentally sound energy use, infrastructure, maritime safety and security as well as economic cooperation.
format Report
author Paul, Michael
Swistek, Göran
author_facet Paul, Michael
Swistek, Göran
author_sort Paul, Michael
title Russia in the Arctic: Development plans, military potential, and conflict prevention
title_short Russia in the Arctic: Development plans, military potential, and conflict prevention
title_full Russia in the Arctic: Development plans, military potential, and conflict prevention
title_fullStr Russia in the Arctic: Development plans, military potential, and conflict prevention
title_full_unstemmed Russia in the Arctic: Development plans, military potential, and conflict prevention
title_sort russia in the arctic: development plans, military potential, and conflict prevention
publisher Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
publishDate 2022
url http://hdl.handle.net/10419/253246
https://doi.org/10.18449/2022RP03
geographic Arctic
geographic_facet Arctic
genre Arctic
Climate change
Sea ice
genre_facet Arctic
Climate change
Sea ice
op_relation Series: SWP Research Paper
No. 3/2022
gbv-ppn:1788309839
doi:10.18449/2022RP03
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/253246
RePEc:zbw:swprps:32022
op_rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
op_doi https://doi.org/10.18449/2022RP03
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