Wikibooks: Public International Law/Nature and Purpose of International Law/Enforcement

• Format: Book
• Language: English
• Subjects: Austin; North Atlantic
• Online Access: https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Public_International_Law/Nature_and_Purpose_of_International_Law/Enforcement

OpenRewi/Chapter Top Template OpenRewi/WIP Author Required knowledge [[International Law and Violence]] Learning objectives       To evaluate the reasons why certain legal scholars have considered international law to be incomplete or “primitive”—especially in relation to its enforcement mechanisms.       Examine the ways different schools of international legal thought have approached and problematised this incompleteness critique and reframed the problem of compliance —or lack thereof— of international law.       To understand the divergence in North Atlantic international legal thought between and European concern for “system” and an Unitedstatesean focus on “process” —without losing sight of what is left outside of this dichotomic framing. =A. Introduction Facing the Austinian Challenge = Since 1832 the field of international law has been haunted by the shadow of the English legal theorist Austin. Antony Anghie ‘Towards a Postcolonial International Law’ in Prabhakar Singh and Benoît Mayer (eds) Critical International Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 124 125. In his initially somewhat ignored but then highly influential collection of lectures The Providence of Jurisprudence Determined John Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray 1832). On the reception of this book in the English legal context we have no better guide than his student Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. See HLA Hart ‘Introduction’ The province of jurisprudence determined and The uses of the study of jurisprudence (Hackett Pub 1998). Austin famously claimed that “international law” was but a contradiction in terms. James B Scott ‘The Legal Nature of International Law’ (1906) 5 Columbia Law Review 124. 129. As committed [[positivist theorist]] who wished to distinguish between “laws strictly so called” and questions of “morality” (as only the former fell within the purview of “the science of jurisprudence”) Austin saw international law as an imprecise misnomer. John ...