How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets

© 2020 Elsevier Ltd Understanding why institutions fail is a major concern for natural resource governance. In systems where resources are managed locally, failure is often attributed to the rules poorly fitting the social-ecological system. But what might also bring failure is the manner with which...

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Main Authors: Snyder, HT, Olsen, NL, Song, AM
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:unknown
Published: 2020
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10453/139484
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spelling ftunivtsydney:oai:opus.lib.uts.edu.au:10453/139484 2023-05-15T16:29:51+02:00 How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets Snyder, HT Olsen, NL Song, AM 2020-01-01 application/pdf http://hdl.handle.net/10453/139484 unknown Marine Policy 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103882 Marine Policy, 2020 0308-597X http://hdl.handle.net/10453/139484 info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess Fisheries Journal Article 2020 ftunivtsydney 2022-03-13T13:55:30Z © 2020 Elsevier Ltd Understanding why institutions fail is a major concern for natural resource governance. In systems where resources are managed locally, failure is often attributed to the rules poorly fitting the social-ecological system. But what might also bring failure is the manner with which the rules are ‘fitted’ to the system. This paper argues that the conceptual development of institutional failure could be made more tenable with cybernetics – the science of control and feedback. In our case study and process tracing of a ‘market’ institution (an open-air fish market in Greenland), we show how recently implemented European food safety regulations have generated unintended negative consequences, limiting Inuit access to marine foodstuffs, altering the social characteristics of food exchange, and giving rise to underground markets for marine foods. These outcomes signal the failure of reforms to this market institution, but not necessarily why it failed. We show how cybernetic orders explain institutional failure, focusing on how command-and-control-style decisions to intervene in marine food trading and handling (considered as the first-order cybernetics) fostered public doubt for the scientific expertise underpinning the reforms, and ultimately led to a public rejection and closure of a new, hygienic, multi-million-dollar marketplace for marine foods. We clarify how second-order cybernetic elements — such as legitimacy, reflexivity, co-design, and interaction among governance actors — could have prevented the observed outcome. Our case expands the conceptual development of institutional failure and clarifies how the lens of cybernetics can inform the study and practice of institutional change in fisheries governance. Article in Journal/Newspaper Greenland inuit University of Technology Sydney: OPUS - Open Publications of UTS Scholars Greenland
institution Open Polar
collection University of Technology Sydney: OPUS - Open Publications of UTS Scholars
op_collection_id ftunivtsydney
language unknown
topic Fisheries
spellingShingle Fisheries
Snyder, HT
Olsen, NL
Song, AM
How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets
topic_facet Fisheries
description © 2020 Elsevier Ltd Understanding why institutions fail is a major concern for natural resource governance. In systems where resources are managed locally, failure is often attributed to the rules poorly fitting the social-ecological system. But what might also bring failure is the manner with which the rules are ‘fitted’ to the system. This paper argues that the conceptual development of institutional failure could be made more tenable with cybernetics – the science of control and feedback. In our case study and process tracing of a ‘market’ institution (an open-air fish market in Greenland), we show how recently implemented European food safety regulations have generated unintended negative consequences, limiting Inuit access to marine foodstuffs, altering the social characteristics of food exchange, and giving rise to underground markets for marine foods. These outcomes signal the failure of reforms to this market institution, but not necessarily why it failed. We show how cybernetic orders explain institutional failure, focusing on how command-and-control-style decisions to intervene in marine food trading and handling (considered as the first-order cybernetics) fostered public doubt for the scientific expertise underpinning the reforms, and ultimately led to a public rejection and closure of a new, hygienic, multi-million-dollar marketplace for marine foods. We clarify how second-order cybernetic elements — such as legitimacy, reflexivity, co-design, and interaction among governance actors — could have prevented the observed outcome. Our case expands the conceptual development of institutional failure and clarifies how the lens of cybernetics can inform the study and practice of institutional change in fisheries governance.
format Article in Journal/Newspaper
author Snyder, HT
Olsen, NL
Song, AM
author_facet Snyder, HT
Olsen, NL
Song, AM
author_sort Snyder, HT
title How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets
title_short How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets
title_full How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets
title_fullStr How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets
title_full_unstemmed How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets
title_sort how cybernetics explains institutional failure: a case of greenland's open-air fish markets
publishDate 2020
url http://hdl.handle.net/10453/139484
geographic Greenland
geographic_facet Greenland
genre Greenland
inuit
genre_facet Greenland
inuit
op_relation Marine Policy
10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103882
Marine Policy, 2020
0308-597X
http://hdl.handle.net/10453/139484
op_rights info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
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